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An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of
synergies via coalition formation. Additively separable hedonic games are a fundamental class
of coalition formation games in which each player has a value for any other player and
the value of a coalition to a particular player is simply the sum of the values he assigns to
the members of his coalition. In this paper, we consider a number of solution concepts
from cooperative game theory, welfare theory, and social choice theory as criteria for
desirable partitions in hedonic games. We then conduct a detailed computational analysis
of computing, checking the existence of, and verifying stable, fair, optimal, and popular
partitions for additively separable hedonic games.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Topics concerning coalitions and coalition formation have come under increasing scrutiny of computer scientists. The rea-
son for this may be obvious. For the proper operation of distributed and multiagent systems, cooperation may be required.
At the same time, collaboration in very large groups may also lead to unnecessary overhead, which may even exceed the
positive effects of cooperation. To model such situations formally, concepts from the social and economic sciences have
proved to be very helpful and thus provide the mathematical basis for a better understanding of the issues involved.
Coalition formation games, as introduced by Drèze and Greenberg [18], provide a simple but versatile formal model that
allows one to focus on coalition formation. In many situations it is natural to assume that a player’s appreciation of a
coalition structure only depends on the coalition he is a member of and not on how the remaining players are grouped.
Initiated by Banerjee et al. [5] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [9], much of the work on coalition formation now concentrates
on these so-called hedonic games. Hedonic games are relevant in modeling many settings such as the formation of groups,
clubs and societies [9] and online social networking [19]. The main focus in hedonic games has been on notions of stability
for coalition structures such as Nash stability, individual stability, contractual individual stability, or core stability. Additively
separable hedonic games (ASHGs) constitute a particularly natural and succinctly representable class of hedonic games. Each
player in an ASHG has a value for any other player and the value of a coalition to a particular player is simply the sum of
the values he assigns to the members of his coalition.
In this paper, we present a systematic investigation of stability, fairness, optimality, and popularity concepts in hedonic
games. After presenting a cohesive bigger picture of the relationships between these concepts, we focus on ASHGs and
characterize the complexity of computing and verifying stable, fair, optimal, and popular partitions. Apart from examining
standard stability notions, we also analyze concepts from fair division and social choice theory in the context of coalition
formation games and examine various standard criteria from the social sciences: Pareto optimality, utilitarian social welfare,
egalitarian social welfare, envy-freeness, and popularity.
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the ﬁrst positive algorithmic result (with respect to one of the standard stability concepts put forward by Bogomolnaia and
Jackson [9]) for general ASHGs with no restrictions on the preferences.
We strengthen the recent results of Sung and Dimitrov [37] by proving in Section 5 that checking whether the core or
the strict core exists is NP-hard, even if the preferences of the players are symmetric.
In Section 6, we consider the complexity of computing welfare maximizing partitions. We show that computing a parti-
tion with maximum egalitarian social welfare is NP-hard. Similarly, computing a partition with maximum utilitarian social
welfare is NP-hard, even when preferences are symmetric and strict. In contrast, we show that it can be checked eﬃciently
whether there exists a partition in which each player is in one of his most favored coalitions.
In Section 7, Pareto optimality and the related stability concept of the contractual strict core (CSC) are studied. It is shown
that verifying whether a partition is in the CSC is coNP-complete, even if the partition under question consists of the grand
coalition. This is the ﬁrst computational hardness result concerning CSC stability in hedonic games of any representation.
The proof can be used to show that verifying whether the partition consisting of the grand coalition is Pareto optimal is
coNP-complete. Furthermore, checking whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete, even when preferences
are strict and symmetric. By contrast, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal partition
when preferences are strict. Thus, we identify a natural problem in coalitional game theory where verifying a possible
solution is presumably harder than actually ﬁnding one. Interestingly, computing an individually rational and Pareto optimal
partition is NP-hard in general.
In Section 8, we consider complexity questions regarding envy-free partitions. It is observed that envy-freeness and
individual rationality together can be easily achieved. Therefore, we turn to the combination of envy-freeness and other
desirable criteria. Checking whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and envy-free is shown to be Σ p2 -
complete. We construct an example which exhibits the tension between stability and envy-freeness and use the example to
prove that checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is NP-complete, even when
preferences are symmetric.
We ﬁnally consider the notion of popularity in Section 9. Popularity has previously been examined in resource allocation
and captures the idea that any change in the outcome requires the approval of a majority of the players. We show that in
contrast to results in matching theory and resource allocation [27,8], the problems of computing and verifying a popular
partition are intractable for ASHGs.
ASHGs are a simple and fundamental class of coalition formation games and many of our computational results carry
over to other classes of coalition formation games. For example, all of our computational hardness results imply com-
putational hardness of the equivalent questions for hedonic coalition nets—a general representation scheme for hedonic
games [19].
2. Related work
There has been considerable work in hedonic games on identifying restrictions on preferences that guarantee the exis-
tence of partitions that satisfy various notions of stability (see, e.g., [9,12]). Sung and Dimitrov [36] presented a taxonomy of
stability concepts which includes the contractual strict core, the most general stability concept that is guaranteed to exist. He-
donic games encapsulate well-studied settings in matching theory such as stable marriage and stable roommates problems
in which only coalitions of size two are admissible [32,25]. We refer to Hajduková [26] for a critical overview of hedonic
games.
More recently, hedonic games have been examined from an algorithmic perspective. The focus has been on the compu-
tational complexity of computing stable or optimal partitions for different classes of hedonic games (see, e.g., [4,17,13,3]).
Cechlárová [13] surveyed the algorithmic problems related to stable partitions in hedonic games in various representations.
Ballester [4] showed that for hedonic games represented by individually rational list of coalitions, the complexity of checking
whether core stable, Nash stable, or individual stable partitions exist is NP-complete. He also proved that every hedonic
game admits a contractually individually stable partition. Coalition formation games have also received attention in the ar-
tiﬁcial intelligence community where the focus has generally been on computing optimal partitions for general transferable
utility coalitional games without any combinatorial structure (see, e.g., [31,33]). In contrast, hedonic games are a simple
class of non-transferable utility coalitional games. Elkind and Wooldridge [19] proposed a fully-expressive model to repre-
sent hedonic games which encapsulates well-known representations such as individually rational list of coalitions and additive
separability.
Additive separability satisﬁes a number of desirable axiomatic properties [7,20]. Moreover, ASHGs are the non-
transferable utility generalization of graph games as studied by Deng and Papadimitriou [15]. Due to their succinct and
natural representation, ASHGs have recently attracted increased interest by computer scientists. Olsen [29] showed that
checking whether a nontrivial Nash stable partition exists in an ASHG is NP-complete if preferences are non-negative and
symmetric. This result was improved by Sung and Dimitrov [37] who showed that checking whether a core stable, strict
core stable, Nash stable, or individually stable partition exists in a general ASHG is NP-hard. Dimitrov et al. [17] obtained
positive algorithmic results for subclasses of ASHGs in which each player merely divides other players into friends and en-
emies. In another paper, Branzei and Larson [11] examined the tradeoff between stability and social welfare in ‘coalitional
318 H. Aziz et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 195 (2013) 316–334aﬃnity games’ which are equivalent to ASHGs. Finally, Gairing and Savani [21,22] showed that for ASHGs with symmetric
preferences, computing partitions that satisfy some variants of individual-based stability is PLS-complete.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the terminology and notation required for our results.
A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair (N,) where N is a set of players and  is a preference proﬁle which speciﬁes
for each player i ∈ N the preference relation i , a reﬂexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on the set Ni = {S ⊆
N | i ∈ S}. The statement S i T denotes that i strictly prefers S over T whereas S ∼i T means that i is indifferent between
coalitions S and T . A partition π is a partition of players N into disjoint coalitions. By π(i), we denote the coalition of π
that includes player i.
A game (N,) is separable if for any player i ∈ N and any coalition S ∈ Ni and for any player j not in S we have the
following: S ∪ { j} i S if and only if {i, j} i {i}; S ∪ { j} ≺i S if and only if {i, j} ≺i {i}; and S ∪ { j} ∼i S if and only if
{i, j} ∼i {i}.
In an additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) (N,), each player i ∈ N has value vi( j) for player j being in the same
coalition as i and if i is in coalition S ∈Ni , then i gets utility ∑ j∈S\{i} vi( j). For coalitions S, T ∈Ni , S i T if and only if∑
j∈S\{i} vi( j)
∑
j∈T \{i} vi( j). Therefore an ASHG can be represented as (N, v).
A preference proﬁle is symmetric if vi( j) = v j(i) for any two players i, j ∈ N and is strict if vi( j) 	= 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
We note that even when vi( j) 	= 0 for all i, j ∈ N , a player can be indifferent between two coalitions. For any player i, let
F (i, A) = { j ∈ A | vi( j) > 0} be the set of friends of player i within A ⊆ N .
Unless mentioned otherwise, all our results are for ASHGs. We now deﬁne important stability concepts used in the
context of coalition formation games.
• We say that a partition π is individually rational (IR) if each player does as well as by being alone, i.e., for all i ∈ N ,
π(i)i {i}. Individual rationality is a minimal requirement of stability.
• A partition π is Nash stable (NS) if no player can beneﬁt by moving from his coalition to another (possibly empty)
coalition, i.e., for all i ∈ N , π(i)i S ∪ {i} for all S ∈ π ∪ {∅}.
• A partition π is individually stable (IS) if no player can beneﬁt by moving from his coalition to another existing (possibly
empty) coalition while not making the members of that coalition worse off, i.e., for all i ∈ N if there exists a (possibly
empty) coalition S 	= π(i) s.t. S ∪ {i} i π(i) then there exists a j ∈ S with S  j S ∪ {i}.
• A partition π is contractually individually stable (CIS) if no player can beneﬁt by moving from his coalition to another
existing (possibly empty) coalition while making no member of either coalition worse off. Formally, for every i ∈ N if
there exists a (possible empty) coalition S 	= π(i) s.t. S ∪ {i} i π(i) then there exists a j ∈ S with S  j S ∪ {i} or there
exists a j′ ∈ π(i) with π(i)  j′ π(i) \ {i}.
• We say that a coalition S ⊆ N strongly blocks a partition π , if each player i ∈ S strictly prefers S to his current coalition
π(i) in the partition π . A partition which admits no blocking coalition is said to be in the core (C).
• We say that a coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks a partition π , if each player i ∈ S weakly prefers S to π(i) and there
exists at least one player j ∈ S who strictly prefers S to his current coalition π( j). A partition which admits no weakly
blocking coalition is in the strict core (SC).
• A partition π is in the contractual strict core (CSC) if any weakly blocking coalition S makes at least one player j ∈ N \ S
worse off when breaking off.
We now formulate concepts from the social sciences, especially the literature on fair division, for the context of hedonic
games. For a utility-based hedonic game (N,) and partition π , we will denote the utility of player i ∈ N by uπ (i).
The different notions of fair, optimal, or popular partitions are deﬁned as follows.1
• We say that a partition π is perfect if π(i) is a most preferred coalition for all players i ∈ N [3].
• The utilitarian social welfare of a partition is deﬁned as the sum of individual utilities of the players: uutil(π) =∑
i∈N uπ (i). A maximum utilitarian partition maximizes the utilitarian social welfare.• The elitist social welfare is given by the utility of the player that is best off: uelite(π) = max{uπ (i) | i ∈ N}. A maximum
elitist partition maximizes the elitist social welfare.
• The egalitarian social welfare is given by the utility of the agent that is worst off: uegal(π) = min{uπ (i) | i ∈ N}. A maxi-
mum egalitarian partition maximizes the egalitarian social welfare.
• A partition π of N is Pareto optimal if there exists no partition π ′ of N which Pareto dominates π , that is for all i ∈ N ,
π ′(i)i π(i) and there exists at least one player j ∈ N such that j ∈ N , π ′( j)  j π( j).
• Envy-freeness is a notion of fairness. In an envy-free (EF) partition, no player has incentive to replace another player. More
formally, a partition π is envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N such that π(i) 	= π( j), it is the case that π(i)i (π( j) \ { j}) ∪ {i}.
1 All welfare notions considered in this paper (utilitarian, elitist, and egalitarian) are based on the interpersonal comparison of utilities.
H. Aziz et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 195 (2013) 316–334 319Fig. 1. Inclusion relationships between stability, fairness, optimality, and popularity concepts for hedonic coalition formation games. For example, every
Nash stable partition is also individually stable.
• Let D(π,π ′) = |P (π,π ′)| − |P (π ′,π)| where P (π,π ′) is the set of players who strictly prefer partition π to π ′ . Then,
partition π is popular if D(π,π ′) 0 for all other partitions π ′ .
The inclusion relationships between stability concepts depicted in Fig. 1 follow from their deﬁnitions.
For a given stability, optimality, or fairness property α, the following natural computational problems can be formulated
for hedonic games.
Veriﬁcation: Given (N,) and a partition π of N , does π satisfy α?
Existence: Does a partition satisfying α for a given (N,) exist?
Computation: If a partition satisfying α for a given (N,) exists, ﬁnd one.
We consider ASHGs (additively separable hedonic games) in this paper. Unless mentioned otherwise, all our results are
for ASHGs. Throughout the paper, we assume familiarity with basic concepts of computational complexity (see, e.g., [30]).
Observation 1. It follows from the deﬁnitions that there exist partitions which yield maximum utilitarian social welfare, elitist social
welfare, and egalitarian social welfare, respectively. Therefore, Existence trivially holds for any notion of maximum welfare.
Similarly, the following observation indicates that Veriﬁcation is easy for a number of solution concepts.
Observation 2. It can be checked in polynomial time whether a partition is one of the following: individually rational, Nash stable,
individually stable, contractual individually stable, and envy-free. For individual rationality, simply check whether each player has a
non-negative payoff. For Nash stability, individual stability, and contractual individual stability, check for each player whether he has
an incentive to move to another coalition in the partition. Finally, for envy-freeness, we need to check for each player whether he wants
to replace another player in another coalition.
4. Contractual individual stability
It is known that computing or even checking the existence of Nash stable or individually stable partitions in an ASHG is
NP-hard [37]. On the other hand, a potential function argument can be used to show that at least one CIS partition exists for
every hedonic game [4]. The potential function argument does not imply that a CIS partition can be computed in polynomial
time. There are many cases in hedonic games, where a solution is guaranteed to exist but computing it is not feasible. For
example, Bogomolnaia and Jackson [9] presented a potential function argument for the existence of a Nash stable partition
for ASHGs with symmetric preferences. However, there are no known polynomial-time algorithms to compute such partitions
and there is evidence that there may not be a polynomial-time algorithm [21]. In this section, we show that a CIS partition
can be computed in polynomial time for ASHGs. The algorithm is formally described as Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. A CIS partition can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Our algorithm to compute a CIS partition can be viewed as successively giving a priority token to players to form
the best possible coalition among the remaining players or join the best possible coalition which tolerates the player. More
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while R 	= ∅ do
a ∈ R
h ←∑b∈F (a,R) va(b)
z ← i + 1
for k ← 1 to i do
h′ ←∑b∈Sk va(b)





if z 	= i + 1 then {a is latecomer}
Sz ← {a} ∪ Sz
R ← R \ {a}
else {a is leader}
i ← z
Si ← {a}
Si ← Si ∪ F (a, R) {add leader’s helpers}
R ← R \ Si
end if
while ∃ j ∈ R such that ∀i ∈ Sz , vi( j) 0 and ∃i ∈ Sz , vi( j) > 0 do
R ← R \ { j}
Sz ← Sz ∪ { j} {add needed players}
end while
end while
return {S1, . . . , Si}
precisely, the algorithm works as follows. Set variable R to N , S0 to ∅, and consider an arbitrary player a ∈ R . Call a the
leader of the ﬁrst coalition Si with i = 1. Move any player j such that va( j) > 0 from R to Si . Such players are called
the leader’s helpers. Then keep moving any player from R to Si which is tolerated by all players in Si and strictly liked
by at least one player in Si . Call such players needed players. Now increment i and take another player a from among the
remaining players R and check the maximum utility he can get from among R . If this utility is less than the utility which
can be obtained by joining a previously formed coalition in {S1, . . . , Si−1}, then send the player to such a coalition where
he can get the maximum utility (as long as all players in the coalition tolerate the incoming player). Such players are
called latecomers. Otherwise, form a new coalition Si around a which is the best possible coalition for player a taking only
players from the remaining players R . Repeat the process until all players have been dealt with and R = ∅. We prove by
induction on the number of coalitions formed that no CIS deviation can occur in the resulting partition. The hypothesis is
the following:
Consider the ﬁrst k + 1 formed coalitions S0, S1, . . . , Sk. Then, the following two statements hold.
(i) There is no CIS deviation for any player in
⋃
i∈{0,...,k} Si .
(ii) There is no CIS deviation for any player in N \⋃i∈{0,...,k} Si to a non-empty coalition in {S0, S1, . . . , Sk}.
Base case. Clearly, the statement is trivially satisﬁed if k = 0.
Induction step. Assume that the hypothesis is true. Then we prove that the same holds for the formed coalitions
S0, . . . , Sk, Sk+1. By the hypothesis, we know that players cannot leave coalitions S0, . . . , Sk . Now consider Sk+1. The leader a
of Sk+1 is either not allowed to join one of the coalitions in {S1, . . . , Sk} or if he is, he has no incentive to join it. Player a
would already have been member of Si for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} if one of the following was true:
• There is some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that the leader of Si likes a.
• There is some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that for all b ∈ Si , vb(a) 0 and there exists b ∈ Si such that vb(a) > 0.
• There is some i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, such that for all b ∈ Si , vb(a) = 0 and ∑b∈Si va(b) >
∑
b∈F (i,N\⋃kj=1 S j) va(b) and∑
b∈Si va(b)
∑
b∈S j va(b) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}.
Therefore a has no incentive or is not allowed to move to another S j for j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. Also a will have no incentive
to move to any coalition formed after S1, . . . , Sk+1 because he can do strictly better in Sk+1. Similarly, a’s helpers are not
allowed to leave Sk+1 even if they have an incentive to. Their movement out of Sk+1 will cause a to become less happy. Also
each needed player in Sk+1 is not allowed to leave because at least one player in Sk likes him. Now consider a latecomer l
in Sk+1. Latecomer l gets strictly less utility in any coalition C ⊆ N \⋃k+1 Si . Therefore l has no incentive to leave Sk+1.i=0
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Finally, we prove that there exists no player x ∈ N \⋃k+1i=0 Si such that x has an incentive to and is allowed to join Si for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,k + 1}. By the hypothesis, we already know that x does not have an incentive or is allowed to a join a coalition
Si for i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. Since x is not a latecomer for Sk+1, x either does not have an incentive to join Sk+1 or is disliked by at
least one player in Sk+1. 
Algorithm 1 may also prove useful as a preprocessing or intermediate step in algorithms for computing other types of
stable partitions in hedonic games.
5. Core and strict core
The core and the strict core are two of the most fundamental stability concepts in cooperative game theory. For trans-
ferable utility cooperative games, both concepts coincide. For hedonic games, this is not necessarily the case. Recently, Sung
and Dimitrov [37] showed that for ASHGs checking whether a core stable or strict core stable partition exists is NP-hard in
the strong sense. Their reduction relied on the asymmetry of the players’ preferences. We prove that even with symmetric
preferences, checking whether a core stable or a strict core stable partition exists is NP-hard in the strong sense. Symmetry
is a natural, but rather strong condition, that yields more positive existence results and can often be exploited algorithmi-
cally. For example, it is known that for ASHGs, computing a Nash stable partition is NP-hard whereas the same problem is
PLS-complete if the preferences are symmetric [9,21].
We ﬁrst present an example of a six-player ASHG with symmetric preferences for which the core (and thereby the strict
core) is empty.
Example 1. Consider a six player symmetric ASHG adapted from an example by Banerjee et al. [5] where
• v1(2) = v3(4) = v5(6) = 6;
• v1(6) = v2(3) = v4(5) = 5;
• v1(3) = v3(5) = v1(5) = 4;
• v1(4) = v2(5) = v3(6) = −33; and
• v2(4) = v2(6) = v4(6) = −33;
as depicted in Fig. 2.
It can be checked that no partition is core stable for the game. Note that if vi( j) = −33, then i and j cannot be in the
same coalition of a core stable partition. Also, players can do better than in a partition of singleton players. We note that the
following are the individually rational coalitions: {1,2}, {1,3}, {1,5}, {1,6}, {1,2,3}, {1,3,5}, {1,5,6}, {2,3}, {3,4}, {3,4,5},
{3,5}, {4,5} and {5,6}.
Consider the partition
π = {{1,2}, {3,4,5}, {6}}.
Then, uπ (1) = uπ (2) = 6, uπ (3) = 10, uπ (4) = 11, uπ (5) = 9, and uπ (6) = 0.
Out of the individually rational coalitions listed above, the only weakly (and also strongly) blocking coalition is {1,5,6}
in which player 1 gets utility 9, player 5 gets utility 10, and player 6 gets utility 11. We note that the coalition {1,2,3}
is not a weakly or strongly blocking coalition because player 3 gets utility 9. Similarly {1,3,5} is not a weakly or strongly
blocking coalition because both player 3 and player 5 are worse off. One way to prevent that {1,5,6} is weakly blocking is
to provide some incentive for player 6 not to deviate with 1 and 5. This idea will be used in the proof of Theorem 2.
We now deﬁne a problem that is NP-complete is the strong sense.
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edges. Thick edges indicate utility 10 14 and dashed edges indicate utility 1/2. Each hexagon at the top looks like the one in Fig. 2.
Name: ExactCoverBy3Sets (E3C)
Instance: A pair (R, S), where R is a set and S is a collection of subsets of R such that |R| = 3m for some positive integer
m and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S .
Question: Is there a sub-collection S ′ ⊆ S that is a partition of R?
It is known that E3C remains NP-complete even if each r ∈ R occurs in at most three members of S [24]. We will use
this assumption in the proof of Theorem 2, which will be shown by a reduction from E3C.
Theorem 2. Checking whether a core stable or a strict core stable partition exists is NP-hard in the strong sense, even when preferences
are symmetric.
Proof. Let (R, S) be an instance of E3C where r ∈ R occurs in at most three members of S . We reduce (R, S) to an ASHG
with symmetric preferences (N, v) in which there is a player ys corresponding to each s ∈ S and there are six players
xr1, . . . , x
r
6 corresponding to each r ∈ R . These players have preferences over each other in exactly the way players 1, . . . ,6
have preferences over each other as in Example 1.
So, N = {xr1, . . . , xr6 | r ∈ R} ∪ {ys | s ∈ S}. We assume that all preferences are symmetric. The player preferences are as
follows (see also Fig. 3):
• For i ∈ R ,
vxi1
(xi2) = vxi3 (x
i




(xi6) = vxi2 (x
i
3) = vxi4 (x
i
5) = 5; and
vxi1
(xi3) = vxi3 (x
i
5) = vxi1 (x
i
5) = 4;
• For any s = {k, l,m} ∈ S ,
vxk6
(xl6) = vxl6 (x
k
6) = vxk6 (x
m
6 ) = vxm6 (xk6) = vxl6 (x
m
6 ) = vxm6 (xl6) = 1/2; and
vxk6
(ys) = vxl6 (y
s) = vxm6 (ys) = 1014 ;
• vi( j) = −33 for any i, j ∈ N for valuations not deﬁned above.
We prove that (N, P ) has a non-empty strict core (and thereby also a non-empty core) if and only if there exists an
S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R .
Assume that there exists an S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R . Then we prove that there exists a strict core stable













} ∣∣ i ∈ R}∪ {{ys} ∣∣ s ∈ S \ S ′}∪ {{ys ∪ {xi6
∣∣ i ∈ s}} ∣∣ s ∈ S ′}.
For all i ∈ R , uπ (xi1) = uπ (xi2) = 6, uπ (xi3) = 10, uπ (xi4) = 11, uπ (xi5) = 9, and uπ (xi6) = 1/2+ 1/2+ 1014 = 1114 > 11.
Also uπ (ys) = 3 · (1014 ) = 3034 for all s ∈ S ′ and uπ (ys) = 0 for all s ∈ S \ S ′ . We see that each player’s utility is non-
negative. Therefore there is no incentive for any player to deviate and form a singleton coalition. From Example 1 we also
know that the only possible strongly blocking (and weakly blocking) coalition is {xi1 xi5, xi6} for any i ∈ R . However, xi6 has no
incentive to be part {xi1, xi5, xi6} because uπ (xi6) = 1114 and vxi6 (x
i
5) + vxi6 (x
i
1) = 6+ 5 = 11. Also xi1 and xi5 have no incentive
to join π(xi6) because their new utility will become negative because of the presence of the y
s player. Assume for the




6, however, can only deviate with a
maximum of six other players of type x j6 because i ∈ R is present in a maximum of three elements in S . In this case xi6 gets
a maximum utility of only 1. Therefore π is in the strict core (and thereby in the core).
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6 . We already know that the only way the partition is core stable is if x
i
6 can be provided disincentive to
deviate with xi5 and x
i
1. The claim is that each x
i
6 needs to be in a coalition with exactly one y
s such that i ∈ s ∈ S and
exactly two other players x j6 and x
k
6 such that {i, j,k} = s ∈ S . We ﬁrst show that xi6 needs to be with exactly one ys such
that i ∈ s ∈ S . Player xi6 needs to be with at least one such ys . If xi6 is only with other x j6s, then we know that xi6 gets
a maximum utility of only 6 · 1/2 = 3. Also, player xi6 cannot be in a coalition with ys and ys
′
such that i ∈ s and i ∈ s′
because both ys and ys
′











6, then there is one element among a ∈ { j,k, l}
such that a /∈ s. Therefore ys and xa6 hate each other and the coalition {ys, xi6, x j6, xk6, xk6} is not even individually rational.
Therefore for the partition to be core stable each xi6 has to be with exactly one y
s such that i ∈ s and least 2 other players
x j6 and x
k
6 where j and k are also members of s. This implies that there exists an S
′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R . 
We now turn to the problem of verifying core or strict core stable partitions. For ASHGs, the problem of testing the core
membership of a partition is coNP-complete [35]. The same reduction as in [35] can also be used to prove that testing strict
core membership of a partition is coNP-complete, even when preferences are symmetric.
Theorem 3. Verifying whether a partition is strict-core stable is coNP-complete, even if preferences are symmetric and vi( j) ∈ {1,−n}
for all i 	= j.
6. Maximizing social welfare
In this section, we examine the complexity of maximizing social welfare in ASHGs. We ﬁrst examine utilitarian welfare.
It is seen that the problems of computing and verifying a maximum utilitarian partition are computationally intractable.
Theorem 4. For maximum utilitarian partitions, the following statements hold.
(i) Computing a maximum utilitarian partition is NP-hard in the strong sense, even when preferences are symmetric and strict and
vi( j) ∈ {−1,+1} for all i, j ∈ N.
(ii) Verifying a maximum utilitarian partition is coNP-complete in the strong sense.
Proof. We prove Theorem 4 by a reduction from the MaxCut problem. Before deﬁning this problem, recall that a cut is a
partition of the vertices of a graph into two disjoint subsets. The cut-set of the cut is the set of edges whose end points are
in different subsets of the partition. In a weighted graph, the weight of the cut is the sum of the weights of the edges in the
cut-set. Then, MaxCut is the following problem:
Name: MaxCut
Instance: An undirected weighted graph G = (V , E) with a weight function w : E →R+ and an integer k.
Question: Does there exist a cut of weight at least k in G?
It is well known that MaxCut is an NP-complete problem. It follows that computing a maxcut is NP-hard. It can also be
shown that the veriﬁcation problem VerifyMaxCut is coNP-complete: given a feasible edge cut, decide whether the edge
cut is a maxcut. This follows from a general argument by Schulz [34, p. 20] concerning the optimization of a linear function
over a 0/1-polytope.
We present a polynomial-time reduction from MaxCut to the problem of checking whether there exists a partition with
utilitarian social welfare of at least k and thereby to the problem of computing a maximum utilitarian partition. It also
serves as a polynomial-time reduction from VerifyMaxCut to the problem of verifying a maximum utilitarian partition.
Consider a connected undirected graph G = (V , E) and positive weights w(i, j) for each edge (i, j). Let W =∑
(i, j)∈E w(i, j). Consider the following method which in polynomial time reduces G = (V , E) to an ASHG (N, v) with|V | + 2 players N = {m1, . . . ,m|V |, s1, s2}. For any two players mi and mj , vmi (mj) = vm j (mi) = −w(i, j). For any player mi
and player s j , vmi (s j) = vs j (mi) = W . Also vs1 (s2) = vs2 (s1) = −W (|V | + 1). Then, it is easy to show that (A, B) is a cut
of weight k if and only if partition π ′ = {{s1 ∪ {mi | i ∈ A}}, {s2 ∪ {mi | i ∈ B}}} is a partition with utilitarian social welfare
W (3|V | + 1) + k, for game (N, v).
Thus, we have established that computing and verifying a maximum utilitarian partition is NP-hard and coNP-complete,
respectively. For the restricted case when preferences are symmetric and strict and vi( j) ∈ {−1,+1} for all i, j ∈ N , comput-
ing a maximum utilitarian partition is still NP-hard. This follows from the observation that computing a maximum utilitarian
partition for strict and symmetric preferences is NP-hard because it is equivalent to the NP-hard problem of maximizing
agreements in the context of correlation clustering [6]. 
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Theorem 5. A maximum elitist partition can be computed or veriﬁed in polynomial time.
Proof. Recall that for any player i, F (i,N) = { j ∈ N | vi( j) > 0}. Let f (i) = ∑ j∈F (i,N) vi( j). Both F (i,N) and f (i) can be
computed in linear time. Let k ∈ N be the player such that f (k)  f (i) for all i ∈ N . Then π = {{{k} ∪ F (k,N)},N \ {{k} ∪
F (k,N)}} is a partition which maximizes the elitist social welfare. As a corollary, we can verify whether a partition π has
maximum elitist social welfare by computing a partition π∗ with maximum elitist social welfare and comparing uelite(π)
with uelite(π∗). 
We now turn our attention to maximum egalitarian partition. Just like maximizing the utilitarian social welfare, maxi-
mizing the egalitarian social welfare is computationally hard.
Theorem 6. For maximum egalitarian partitions, the following statements hold.
(i) Computing a maximum egalitarian partition is NP-hard in the strong sense.
(ii) Furthermore, verifying a maximum egalitarian partition is coNP-complete.
Proof.
(i) We provide a polynomial-time reduction from the NP-hard problem MaxMinMachineCompletionTime [16,38]:
Name: MaxMinMachineCompletionTime
Instance: A set of m identical machines M = {M1, . . . ,Mm}, a set of n independent jobs J = { J1, . . . , Jn} where job J i
has processing time pi .
Output: Allot jobs to the machines such that the minimum processing time (without machine idle times) of all ma-
chines is maximized.
Let I be an instance of MaxMinMachineCompletionTime and let P =∑ni=1 pi . We assume that n m, because other-
wise any allocation of jobs to machines results in a minimum processing time of zero. From I we construct an ASHG
(N, v) with N = {i | Mi ∈ M} ∪ {si | J i ∈ J } and the preferences of the players are as follows: for all i = 1, . . . ,m and all
j = 1, . . . ,n let vi(s j) = p j and vs j (i) = P . Also, for 1 i, i′ m, i 	= i′ let vi(i′) = −(P + 1) and for 1 j, j′  n, j 	= j′
let vs j (vs j′ ) = 0. Each player i corresponds to machine Mi and each player s j corresponds to job J j .
Let π be the partition which maximizes uegal(π). We show that players 1, . . . ,m are in separate coalitions and each
player s j is in π(i) for some 1 i m. We can do so by proving two claims. The ﬁrst claim is that for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that i 	= j, we have that i /∈ π( j). Assume there exist exactly two players i and j for which this is not the case.
Then we know that uπ (i) = −(P + 1) +∑s j∈π(i) p j . Since
∑
s j∈π(i) p j  P , we know that uπ (i) = uπ ( j) < 0, uπ (a) 0
for all a ∈ N \{i, j} and thus uegal(π) < 0. However, if i deviates and forms a singleton coalition in new partition π ′ , then
uπ ′ (i) = 0 and uπ ′ ( j) 0 and the utility of other players has not decreased. Therefore, uegal(π ′) 0, a contradiction.
The second claim is that each player s j is in a coalition with a player i. Assume this was not the case so that there
exists a non-empty set S ′ of such players. Since we already know that all is are in separate coalitions, then uπ (a) > 0
for all a ∈ N \ S ′ and uegal(π) = uπ (s j) = 0 for all s j ∈ S ′ . But then each such s j can deviate and join π(i) for any
1 i m to form a new partition π ′ . In doing so, the utility of no player decreases and uπ ′(s j) > 0. If this is done for
all players from S ′ , we have uegal(π ′) > 0 for the new partition π ′ which is a contradiction.
A job allocation Alloc(π) corresponds to a partition π where s j is in π(i) if job J j is assigned to Mi for all j and i.
Note that the utility uπ (i) =∑s j∈π(i) vi(s j) =
∑
s j∈π(i) p j of a player corresponds to the total completion time of all
jobs assigned to Mi according to Alloc(π). Let π∗ be a maximum egalitarian partition. Assume that there is another
partition π ′ and Alloc(π ′) induces a strictly greater minimum completion time. We know that uπ∗(s j) = uπ ′′(s j) = P
for all 1 j  n and uπ∗ (i) P for all 1 i m. But then from the assumption we have uegal(π ′) > uegal(π∗) which is
a contradiction.
(ii) We now prove that verifying a maximum egalitarian partition is coNP-complete. Both MaxMinMachineCompletionTime
and computing a maximum egalitarian partition do not appear to be problems which involve the optimization of a
linear function over a 0/1-polytope. Nonetheless Deuermeyer et al. [16] observed that MaxMinMachineCompletionTime
is NP-hard by a reduction from integer partition—a well-known NP-complete problem.
Name: Partition
Instance: A set of k positive integer weights A = {a1, . . . ,ak} such that ∑ai∈A ai = W .
Question: Is it possible to partition A, into two subsets A1 ⊆ A, A2 ⊆ A so that A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and A1 ∪ A2 = A and∑
a ∈A ai =
∑
a ∈A ai = W /2?i 1 i 2
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The problem Partition is equivalent to the following optimization problem over a 0/1-polytope: compute a subset
S ⊆ A such that ∑a∈S aW /2 and which minimizes
∑
a∈S a. Therefore, we can again utilize the general argument by
Schulz [34, p. 20] concerning the optimization of a linear function over a 0/1-polytope that if computing an optimal
solution is NP-hard, then verifying the optimality of the feasible solution is as hard. It follows that verifying a maximum
egalitarian partition is coNP-complete. 
Recall that a partition π is perfect if π(i) is a most preferred coalition for all players i.
Theorem 7. For separable hedonic games, the existence of a perfect partition can be checked in polynomial time. Moreover, a perfect
partition can be veriﬁed in polynomial time.
Proof. The idea behind the algorithm is to build up coalitions and ensure that player i and F (i,N), all the player i likes, are
in the same coalition. While ensuring this, if there is a player j and a player j′ ∈ E( j) (disliked by j) in the same coalition,
then return ‘no’. In each step, either a player gets all the players he likes or it is found that some player is in the same
coalition as a player he strictly dislikes.
For a given partition π , it can easily be checked whether for all i ∈ N , π(i)i S for all S ∈Ni . This is only possible if
F (i,N) ⊆ π(i) and π(i) ∩ E(i) = ∅. 
7. Contractual strict core and Pareto optimality
In this section, we present a number of results concerning CSC stability and Pareto optimality. The complexity of Pareto
optimality has already been considered in several settings such as house allocation (see, e.g., [2]). Bouveret and Lang [10]
examined the complexity of Pareto optimal allocations in resource allocation problems. Although the resource allocation
model with additive utilities has some similarities with ASHGs, there are some distinct differences. The problem of com-
puting Pareto optimal allocations is already trivial in resource allocation: give each object to the agent who values it the
most. In the context of coalition formation, the question is more interesting. Furthermore, our hardness results for the grand
coalition (Theorem 9) or symmetric preferences (Theorem 10) have no equivalent in the context of resource allocation.
Firstly, we prove that verifying whether a partition is CSC stable is coNP-complete. Interestingly, coNP-completeness
holds even if the partition in question consists of the grand coalition. The proof of Theorem 8 is by a reduction from the
weakly NP-complete problem Partition.
Theorem 8. Verifying whether the partition consisting of the grand coalition is CSC stable is weakly coNP-complete.
Proof. The problem is clearly in coNP because a partition π ′ resulting from a CSC deviation from {N} is a succinct certiﬁcate
that {N} is not CSC stable. We prove NP-hardness of deciding whether the grand coalition is not CSC stable by a reduction
from Partition. We can reduce an instance I of Partition to an instance I ′ = ((N, v),π) where π = {N} and (N, v) is an
ASHG deﬁned in the following way (see also Fig. 4):
• N = {x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, . . . , zk};
• vx1 (y1) = vx1 (y2) = vx2 (y1) = vx2 (y2) = W /2;• vx1 (zi) = vx2 (zi) = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k};• vx1 (x2) = vx2 (x1) = −W ;• v y1 (y2) = v y2 (y1) = −W ; and• va(b) = 0 for any a,b ∈ N for which va(b) is not already deﬁned.
We see that uπ (x1) = uπ (x2) = W , uπ (y1) = uπ (y2) = −W , uπ (zi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. We show that π is not CSC
stable if and only if I is a ‘yes’ instance of Partition. Assume I is a ‘yes’ instance of Partition and there exists an A1 ⊆ A
such that
∑
ai∈A1 ai = W /2. Then, form the partition
π ′ = {{x1, y1} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ A1}, {x2, y2} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ N \ A1}
}
.
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• uπ ′(x1) = uπ ′(x2) = W ;
• uπ ′(y1) = uπ ′ (y2) = 0; and
• uπ (zi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}.
The coalition C1 = {x1, y1} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ A1} can be considered as a coalition that leaves the grand coalition so that all
players in N do as well as before and at least one player in C1, namely y1, gets strictly more utility. Also, the departure
of C1 does not make any player in N \ C1 worse off.
Assume that I is a ‘no’ instance of Partition and there exists no A1 ⊆ A such that ∑ai∈A1 ai = W /2. We show that no
CSC deviation is possible from π by considering all different possibilities for a CSC blocking coalition C :
(i) x1, x2, y1, y2 /∈ C ;
(ii) x1, x2 /∈ C and there exists y ∈ {y1, y2} such that y ∈ C ;
(iii) x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ C ;
(iv) x1, x2 ∈ C and |C ∩ {y1, y2}| 1; and
(v) there exists x ∈ {x1, x2} and y ∈ {y1, y2} such that x, y ∈ C , {x1, x2} \ x C , and {y1, y2} \ y  C .
We show that in each of the cases, C is a not a valid CSC blocking coalition.
(i) If C is empty, then there exists no CSC blocking coalition. If C is not empty, then x1 and x2 get strictly less utility when
a subset of {z1, . . . , zk} deviates.
(ii) In this case, both x1 and x2 get strictly less utility when y ∈ {y1, y2} leaves N .
(iii) If {z1, . . . , zk} ⊂ C , then there is no deviation as C = N . If there exists a zi ∈ {z1, . . . , zk} such that zi /∈ C , then x1 and x2
get strictly less utility than in N .
(iv) If |C ∩ {y1, y2}| = 0, then the utility of no player increases. If |C ∩ {y1, y2}| = 1, then the utility of y1 and y2 increases
but the utility of x1 and x2 decreases.
(v) Consider C = {x, y} ∪ S where S ⊆ {z1, . . . , zk}. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x = x1 and y = y1. We
know that y1 and y2 get strictly more utility because they are now in different coalitions. Since I is a ‘no’ instance of
Partition, we know that there exists no S such that
∑
a∈S vx1 (a) = W /2. If
∑
a∈S vx1 (a) > W /2, then uπ (x2) < W . If∑
a∈S vx1 (a) < W /2, then uπ (x1) < W .
Thus, if I is a ‘no’ instance of Partition, then there exists no CSC deviation. 
From the proof of Theorem 8, it can be seen that π is not Pareto optimal if and only if I is a ‘yes’ instance of Partition.
Theorem 9. Verifying whether the partition consisting of the grand coalition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete.
We show that checking whether a partition is Pareto optimal is hard even under severely restricted settings.
Theorem 10. The problem of checking whether a partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete in the strong sense, even when prefer-
ences are symmetric and strict.
Proof. The problem is clearly in coNP as another partition which Pareto dominates the given partition π is a witness
that π is not Pareto optimal. The reduction is from the NP-complete problem E3C (EXACT-3-COVER) to deciding whether
a given partition is Pareto dominated by another partition or not. Recall that in E3C, an instance is a pair (R, S), where
R = {1, . . . , |R|} is a set and S is a collection of subsets of R such that |R| = 3m for some positive integer m and |s| = 3 for
each s ∈ S . The question is whether there is a sub-collection S ′ ⊆ S which is a partition of R .
It is known that E3C remains NP-complete even if each r ∈ R occurs in at most three members of S [24]. Let (R, S) be
an instance of E3C. (R, S) can be reduced to an instance ((N, v),π), where (N, v) is an ASHG deﬁned in the following way.
Let N = {ws, xs, ys | s ∈ S} ∪ {zr | r ∈ R}. The players preferences are symmetric and strict and are deﬁned as follows (as also
depicted in Fig. 5):
• vws (xs) = vxs (ys) = 3 for all s ∈ S;
• v ys (ws) = v ys (ws′ ) = −1 for all s, s′ ∈ S;
• v ys (zr) = 1 if r ∈ s and v ys (zr) = −7 if r /∈ s;
• vzr (zr′ ) = 1/(|R| − 1) for any r, r′ ∈ R such that r 	= r′; and
• va(b) = −7 for any a,b ∈ N and a 	= b for which va(b) is not already deﬁned.
The partition π in the instance ((N, v),π) is {{xs, ys}, {ws} | s ∈ S}}∪{{zr | r ∈ R}}. We see that the utilities of the players
are as follows: uπ (ws) = 0 for all s ∈ S; uπ (xs) = uπ (ys) = 3 for all s ∈ S; and uπ (zr) = 1 for all r ∈ R .
Assume that there exists S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R . Then we prove that π is not Pareto optimal and
there exists another partition π ′ of N which Pareto dominates π . We form another partition π ′ = {{xs,ws} | s ∈ S ′} ∪
{{ys, zi, z j, zk} | s ∈ S ′ ∧ i, j,k ∈ s} ∪ {{xs, ys}, {ws} | s ∈ (S \ S ′)}}. In that case, uπ ′ (ws) = 3 for all s ∈ S ′; uπ ′(ws) = 0 for all
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are omitted: All edges between any ys and zr have weight 1 if r ∈ s. All zr′ , zr′′ with r′ 	= r′′ are connected with weight 1|R|−1 . All missing edges have
weight −7.
s ∈ S \ S ′; uπ (xs) = uπ (ys) = 3 for all s ∈ S; and uπ (zr) = 1 + 2/(|R| − 1) for all r ∈ R . Whereas the utilities of no player
in π ′ decreases, the utility of some players in π ′ is more than in π . Since π ′ Pareto dominates π , π is not Pareto optimal.
We now show that if there exists no S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R , then π is Pareto optimal. We note that −7 is
a suﬃciently large negative valuation to ensure that if va(b) = vb(a) = −7, then a,b ∈ N cannot be in the same coalition in
a Pareto optimal partition. Assume for the sake of contradiction that π is not Pareto optimal and there exists a partition π ′
which Pareto dominates π . We will see that if there exists a player i ∈ N such that uπ ′(i) > uπ (i), then there exists at least
one j ∈ N such that uπ ′ ( j) < uπ ( j). The only players whose utility can increase (without causing some other player to be
less happy) are {xs | s ∈ S}, {ws | s ∈ S} or {zr | r ∈ R}. We consider these player classes separately. If the utility of player xs
increases, it can only increase from 3 to 6 so that xs is in the same coalition as ys and ws . However, this means that ys ’s
utility is decreased. The utility of ys can increase or stay the same only if it forms a coalition with some zrs. However in
that case, to satisfy all zrs, there needs to exist an S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R .
Assume the utility of a player ws for s ∈ S increases. This is only possible if ws is in the same coalition as xs . Clearly,
the coalition formed is {ws, xs} because coalition {ws, xs, ys} brings a utility of 2 to ys . In that case ys needs to form a
coalition {ys, zi, z j, zk} where s = {i, j,k}. If ys forms a coalition {ys, zi, z j, zk}, then all players ys′ for s′ ∈ (S \ {s}) need
to form coalitions of the form {ys′ , zi′ , z j′ , zk′ } such that s′ = {i′, j′,k′}. Otherwise, their utility of 3 decreases. This is only
possible if there exists a set S ′ ⊆ S of R such that S ′ is a partition of R .
Assume that there exists a partition π ′ that Pareto dominates π and the utility of a player uπ ′ (zr) > uπ (zr) for some
r ∈ R . This is only possible if each zr forms the coalition of the form {zr, zr′ , zr′′ , ys} where s = {r, r′, r′′}. This can only
happen if there exists a set S ′ ⊆ S of R such that S ′ is a partition of R . Thus we have proved that π is not Pareto optimal
if and only if (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance. 
The fact that checking whether a partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete has no obvious implications on the com-
plexity of computing a Pareto optimal partition. In fact there is a simple polynomial-time algorithm to compute a partition
which is Pareto optimal for strict preferences.
Theorem 11. For strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The statement follows from an application of serial dictatorship (see, e.g., [1]). Serial dictatorship is a well-known
mechanism in resource allocation in which an arbitrary player is chosen as the ‘dictator’ who is then given his most favored
allocation and the process is repeated until all players or resources have been dealt with. In the context of coalition for-
mation, serial dictatorship is well deﬁned if preferences of players over coalitions are strict. Serial dictatorship is also well
deﬁned for ASHGs with strict preferences as the dictator forms a coalition with all the players he strictly likes who have
not been considered as dictators or are not already in some dictator’s coalition. The resulting partition π is such that for
any other partition π ′ , at least one dictator will strictly prefer π to π ′ . Therefore π is Pareto optimal. 
A standard criticism of Pareto optimality is that it admits inherently unfair allocations. To address this criticism, the
algorithm can be modiﬁed to obtain less lopsided partitions. Whenever an arbitrary player is selected to become the dictator
among the remaining players, choose a player that does not get extremely high elitist social welfare among the remaining
players. Nevertheless, even this modiﬁed algorithm may output a partition that fails to be individually rational.
We know that the set of partitions which are both Pareto optimal and individually rational is non-empty. Repeated
Pareto improvements on an individually rational partition consisting of singletons leads to a Pareto optimal and individually
rational partition. We show that computing a Pareto optimal and individually rational partition for ASHGs is weakly NP-hard.
To prove the statement, we ﬁrst prove the following theorem.
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Proof. Consider the decision problem SubsetSum in which an instance consists of a set of k integer weights A = {a1, . . . ,ak}
and the question is whether there exists a non-empty S ⊆ A such that ∑s∈S s = 0?
Name: SubsetSum
Instance: A set of k integer weights A = {a1, . . . ,ak}.
Question: Does there exist a non-empty S ⊆ A such that ∑s∈S s = 0?
Since SubsetSum for positive integers is NP-complete, it follows that MaximalSubsetSum, the problem of ﬁnding a max-
imal cardinality subset S ⊆ A such that ∑s∈S s = 0 is NP-hard.
We prove the theorem by a reduction from MaximalSubsetSum. Reduce an instance I of MaximalSubsetSum to an ASHG
(N, v) deﬁned in the following way:
• N = {x, y1, y2} ∪ Z where Z = {zi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}};
• vx(y1) = vx(y2) = k + 1; vx(zi) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k};
• v y1 (zi) = −vzi (y1) = −v y2 (zi) = vzi (y2) = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}; and• va(b) = 0 for any a,b ∈ N for which va(b) is not already deﬁned.
First, we show that in an individually rational partition π , no player except x gets positive utility, i.e., uπ (b) = 0 for
all b ∈ N \ {x}. Assume that without loss of generality y1 gets positive utility in π . This implies that there exists a subset
Z ′ = Z ∩π(y1) such that ∑z∈Z ′ v y1 (z) > 0. Then there exists z ∈ Z ′ such that v y1 (z) > 0 which means that vz(y1) < 0. Due
to individual rationality, y2 ∈ π(z) = π(y1). But if y1 ∈ π(y2), then uπ (y2) =∑z∈Z ′ −v y1 (z) < 0 and π is not individually
rational.
Assume that there exists a zi ∈ Z such that uπ (zi) > 0. Then without loss of generality vzi (y1) > 0 and due to individual
rationality y1 ∈ π(zi). Again due to individual rationality, y1 needs to be with another z j such that v y1 (z j) > 0. And again
due to individual rationality, z j needs to be with y2. This means, that for each zl ∈ π(zi) ∩ Z , uπ (zl) = al − al = 0.
We show that in every CSC stable and individually rational partition π , we have y1, y2 ∈ π(x). For any other partition π ′ ,
in which this does not hold, uπ ′ (x) 2k + 1< 2k + 2 = uπ (x).
Consider an S ⊆ A and let π Sz be any partition of {zi | ai ∈ A \ S}. The claim is that π is a CSC stable and individually
rational partition if and only if π is of the form {{x, y1, y2} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ S}} ∪ π Sz where S ⊆ A is the maximal subset such
that
∑
s∈S s = 0.
Assume that S ⊆ A is not a maximal subset such that ∑s∈S s = 0. If
∑
s∈S s 	= 0, there exists a y ∈ {y1, y2} such
that uπ (y) < 0. If S is not maximal then there is a larger set S ′ and a corresponding partition π ′ = {{x, y1, y2} ∪
{zi | ai ∈ S ′}} ∪ π S ′z with uπ (x) = |S| < |S ′| = uπ ′ (x) and uπ (b) = uπ ′ (b) for all b ∈ N \ {x}. For any other S ′ ⊆ A such
that |S ′| > |S|, we know that ∑s′∈S ′ s′ 	= 0 which implies that there is a y ∈ {y1, y2} which gets negative utility. 
As a corollary, we get the following.
Corollary 1. Computing a Pareto optimal and individually rational partition is weakly NP-hard.
Proof. Observe that a partition which is Pareto optimal and individually rational is also CSC stable and individually ratio-
nal. 
8. Envy-freeness
Envy-freeness is a desirable property in resource allocation, especially in cake cutting settings. Lipton et al. [28] proposed
different variants of envy-minimization and examined the complexity of minimizing envy in resource allocation. Bogomol-
naia and Jackson [9] mentioned envy-freeness in the context of hedonic games but focused on stability.
Envy-freeness resembles Nash stability in that no player has an incentive to move to another coalition. However, one
can produce simple examples to show that envy-freeness does not imply Nash stability and Nash stability does not imply
envy-freeness.
Example 2. A partition that satisﬁes envy-freeness may not be Nash stable. Take the game (N, v) where N = {1,2} and
where v is speciﬁed by v1(2) = v2(1) = 1. Then the partition π = {{1}, {2}} satisﬁes envy-freeness but it is not Nash
stable. Similarly, a Nash stable partition may not satisfy envy-freeness. Take the game (N, v) where N = {1,2,3} where v
is speciﬁed by: v1(2) = 1, v1(3) = −1, v2(3) = v3(2) = 2, and v2(1) = v3(1) = 0. Consider the partition π = {{1}, {2,3}}
which is Nash stable. However, π does not satisfy envy-freeness because player 1 is envious of player 3 and would prefer
to replace him to be with player 2.
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Unlike Nash stability, we already know that envy-freeness can be easily achieved.
Observation 3. The partition of singletons is envy-free and individually rational.
Therefore, in conjunction with envy-freeness, we seek to satisfy other properties such as stability or Pareto optimality.
For symmetric ASHGs, it is known that Nash stable partitions always exist and they correspond to partitions for which the
utilitarian social welfare is a local optimum (see, e.g., [9]). We now show that for symmetric ASHGs, there may not exist
any partition that is both envy-free and Nash stable.
Example 3. Consider an ASHG (N, v) where N = {1,2,3} and v is deﬁned as follows (see also Fig. 6): v1(2) = v2(1) = 3,
v1(3) = v3(1) = 3, and v2(3) = v3(2) = −7. Then there exists no partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable.
We use the game in Example 3 as a gadget to prove the following.2
Theorem 13. Checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is NP-complete in the strong sense,
even when preferences are symmetric.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP since envy-freeness and Nash stability can be veriﬁed in polynomial time. We reduce
the problem from E3C. Let (R, S) be an instance of E3C where R is a set and S is a collection of subsets of R such that
|R| = 3m for some positive integer m and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S . We will use the fact that E3C remains NP-complete even
if each r ∈ R occurs in at most three members of S . (R, S) can be reduced to an instance (N, v) where (N, v) is an ASHG
deﬁned in the following way. Let N = {ys | s ∈ S} ∪ {zr1, zr2, zr3 | r ∈ R}. We set all preferences as symmetric. The players
preferences are as follows:
• vzr1 (zr2) = vzr2 (zr1) = 3, vzr1 (zr3) = 3 and vzr2 (zr3) = vzr3 (zr2) = −7 for all r ∈ R;
• vzi1 (z
j
1) = vzi1 (z
k
1) = vz j1 (z
k
1) = 1/10 and v ys (zi1) = v ys (z j1) = v ys (zk1) = 28/10 for all s = {i, j,k} ∈ S; and
• va(b) = vb(a) = −7 for all a,b ∈ N for which valuations have not been deﬁned.
We note that −7 is a suﬃciently large negative valuation to ensure that if va(b) = vb(a) = −7, then a and b will get
negative utility if they are in the same coalition. We show that there exists an envy-free and Nash stable partition for (N, v)
if and only if (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C.
Assume that there exists S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R . Then there exists a partition π = {{ys, zi1, z j1, zk1} | s ={i, j,k} ∈ S ′} ∪ {{zr2}, {zr3} | r ∈ R} ∪ {{s} | s ∈ S \ S ′}. It is easy to see that partition π is Nash stable and envy-free. Players
zr1 and z
r
3 both had an incentive to be with each other when they are singletons. However, each z
r
1 now gets utility 3 by





s where s = {r, r′, r′′} ∈ S . Therefore zr1 has no incentive to be with zr3 and zr3 has no





s} because vzr3 (zr
′
1 ) = vzr3 (zr
′′
1 ) = vzr3 (ys) = −7. Similarly, no player is envious of another player.
Assume that there exists no partition S ′ ⊆ S of R such that S ′ is a partition of R . Then, there exists at least one r ∈ R





s} where s = {r, r′, r′′} ∈ S . Then the only individually rational
coalitions which zr1 can form and get utility at least 3 are the following {zr1, zr3}, {zr1, zr2}. In the ﬁrst case, zr1 wants to deviate
to {zr3}. In the second case, zr2 is envious and wants to replace zr3. Therefore, there exists no partition which is both Nash
stable and envy-free. 
While the existence of a Pareto optimal partition and an envy-free partition is guaranteed, we show that checking
whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal is hard.
Theorem 14. Checking whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and envy-free is Σ p2 -complete.
2 Example 3 and the proof of Theorem 13 also apply to the combination of envy-freeness and IS (individual stability).
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Proof. An instance is a ‘yes’ instance if it admits an envy-free partition that Pareto dominates every other partition. There-
fore the problem is in the complexity class NPcoNP = Σ p2 .
We prove hardness by a reduction from a problem concerning resource allocation (with additive utilities) [14]. A resource
allocation problem is a tuple (I, X,w) where I is a set of agents, X is a set of indivisible objects and w : I × X → R is a
weight function. An a : I → 2X is an allocation if for all i, j ∈ I such that i 	= j, we have a(i) ∩ a( j) = ∅. The resultant utility
of each agent i ∈ I is then ∑x∈a(i) w(i, x). It was shown by de Keijzer et al. [14] that the problem ∃-EEF-ADD of checking
the existence of an envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation is Σ p2 -complete.
Now, consider an instance (I, X,w) of ∃-EEF-ADD and reduce it to an instance (N, v) of an ASHG where N = I ∪ X and
v is speciﬁed by the following values:
• vi(x j) = w(i, x j) and vx j (i) = 0 for all i ∈ I , x j ∈ X ;• vxk (x j) = vx j (xk) = 0 for all x j, xk; and• vi( j) = v j(i) = −W · |I ∪ X | for all i, j ∈ I where W =∑i∈I,x j∈X |w(i, x j)|.
It can then be shown that there exists a Pareto optimal and envy-free partition in (N, v) if and only if (I, X,w) is a ‘yes’
instance of ∃-EEF-ADD. It is clear that for any Pareto optimal partition π , there exist no i, j ∈ I ⊂ N such that i 	= j and





k∈(π(i)\{ j}) vi(k) − W < 0 and
∑
k∈π(i) v j(k) =
∑
k∈(π(i)\{i}) v j(k) − W < 0. Then i
and j can be separated to form singletons to get another partition π ′ , where the value of every other player k ∈ (N \ {i, j})
gets the same value while i and j get at least zero value. Therefore there is a one-to-one correspondence between any such
partition π and allocation a where a(i) = π(i) \ {i}. It now easy to see that π is Pareto optimal and envy-free in G if and
only if a is a Pareto optimal and envy-free allocation. 
The results of this section show that, even though envy-freeness can be trivially satisﬁed on its own, it becomes much
more delicate when considered in conjunction with other desirable properties.
9. Popularity
In this section, we consider the complexity of verifying and checking the existence of popular partitions for additively
separable hedonic games (ASHGs). If changing an outcome requires the approval of a majority of players, then popularity can
also be considered a notion of stability. The idea of using popularity in matching theory was initiated by Gärdenfors [23].
Popular matchings were then studied in the context of assignment problems (in which objects, posts or houses) are allocated
among agents such that each agent receives at most one object (see, e.g., [27]). Biró et al. [8] considered popular outcomes
in the context of marriage games and roommate games.
The following is an example of an ASHG which does not admit a popular partition.
Example 4. Consider the following ASHG (see also Fig. 7): N = {a1,a2,a3,b1,b2} such that vai (b1) = 2 and vai (b2) = 1 for
all i = 1,2,3; vbi (a j) = 1 for all i = 1,2 and j = 1,2,3; and vx(y) = −4 for all other x and y. Then, there exists no popular
partition. For example in {{a1,b1}, {a2,b2}, {a3}}, a2 and a3 can both strictly improve their utility.
In fact, not only may an ASHG not admit a popular partition, but checking whether there exists a popular partition is
NP-hard. Whereas verifying a popular allocation is already known to be polynomial-time solvable for roommate games [8],
we show that the same problem is coNP-complete for ASHGs.
Theorem 15. For popular partitions, the following statements hold.
(i) Checking whether there exists a popular partition is NP-hard.
(ii) Verifying whether a partition is popular is coNP-complete.
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(i) The reduction is from E3C to deciding whether there exists a popular partition. In our reduction, we use as a gadget the
ASHG discussed in Example 4. Let (R, S) be an instance of E3C where R is a set and S is a collection of subsets of R
such that |R| = 3m for some positive integer m, |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S , and each r ∈ R occurs in at most three members
of S . (R, S) can be reduced to an instance (N, v), where (N, v) is an ASHG deﬁned in the following way.
Let N = {ar1,ar2,ar3,br1,br2 | r ∈ R} ∪ {ys, zs1, zs2 | s ∈ S} and v be as follows:• vari (br1) = 2 and vari (br2) = 1 for all i = 1,2,3 and r ∈ R;• vbri (arj) = 1 for all i = 1,2, j = 1,2,3 and r ∈ R;
• var3 (ar
′
3 ) = 1/10 for all r, r′ ∈ s ∈ S such that r 	= r′;
• var3 (ys) = 4/5 and v ys (ar3) = 0 for all s ∈ S and r ∈ R such that r ∈ s;• v ys (zs1) = v ys (zs2) = vzs1 (ys) = vzs2 (ys) = 1/2 and vzs1 (zs2) = vzs2 (zs1) = 0 for all s ∈ S; and• vx(y) = −4 for all other x and y.
The main idea of the reduction is that if (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C, then players of the form ar3 will be suﬃciently
happy to not disrupt the coalitions {ar1,br1} and {ar2,br2}. If (R, S) is a ‘no’ instance of E3C, then players of the form ar3
will be able to disrupt the coalitions {ar1,br1} and {ar2,br2}. We show that there exists a popular partition of (N, v) if and
only if (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C.
Assume (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C. Then, there exists S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R .
Consider the following partition π .





3 } | s = {i, j,k} ∈ S ′};• {{zs1, zs2} | s ∈ S ′};• {{ys, zs1, zs2} | s ∈ N \ S ′}.
It can be shown that the partition π is popular. If a player ar3 is in a coalition with a player b
r
k for r ∈ {1,2}, then that
partition is not popular. No player ar1 can become happier. Any player a
r
2 can become happier but only at the expense
of ar1. Each player a
r
3 gets utility one and is suﬃciently happy to not disrupt the coalitions {ar1,br1} and {ar2,br2}. A player
ar3 can become happier by being with at least y
s and ys
′
such that r ∈ s and r ∈ s′ but in that coalition, the number
of players who are strictly happier is not more than the number of players who are strictly less happy. The only new
coalition which can form in which the number of players who are strictly happier is more than the number of players




3 } can move to a coalition




3 who are less happy.
Assume that there exists a popular partition π . Then, we show that (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C. The only type of








3 needs to be with
at least two ar
′
3 s and at least one likable y
s to get a payoff of at least 4/5+2(1/10) = 1. If ar3 is only with likable ar
′
3 s, it
can get a maximum utility of 6 · 1/10 = 6/10 due to the initial assumption about the number of occurrences of r in S .
This is not enough as ar3 got utility 1 in π . If a
r
3 is with at least two likable y
ss and between zero to six likable ar
′
3 s
in a coalition S , then in each case, at least |S| players (including some zs1 and zs2s) improve their utilities and less than|S| − 1 players get less utility if the unhappy yss join their corresponding zs1 and zs2s. If ar3 is with one likable ys and at
least three likable ar
′
3 s in a coalition T , then y
s and at least one ar
′
3 in T get negative utility. A partition π
′ in which all
coalitions are exactly the same but ys moves away from T and joins zs1 and z
s
2 is more popular than π . Therefore each
ar3 needs to be with exactly two likable a
r′
3 s and exactly one likable y
s in partition π . But this means that there exists
an S ′ ⊆ S such that S ′ is a partition of R . This completes the proof.
(ii) We introduce the following notation for the proof: DT (π,π ′) = |PT (π,π ′)| − |PT (π ′,π)| where T ⊆ N and PT (π,π ′)
is the set of players in T who strictly prefer allocation π to π ′ .
Let the partition in question be π . The problem is clearly in coNP as a partition which is more popular than π is a
polynomial-time certiﬁcate that π is not popular.
The reduction is from E3C to the problem ((N, v),π) of deciding whether partition π is popular for game (N, v).
For an instance (R, S), let Z = {1, . . . , |R| + |S|} and the sets in S are assumed to have a natural ordering so that
S = {s1, . . . , s|S|}. Then, N is deﬁned as follows: N = {ai | i ∈ Z} ∪ {bi | i ∈ Z} ∪ {cr | r ∈ R} ∪ {di, j | i ∈ S, j ∈ Z}.
We will refer to {ai | i ∈ Z} by A, {bi | i ∈ Z} by B , {cr | r ∈ R} by C , and {di, j | si ∈ S, j ∈ Z} by D . Let γ (i) = { j 	= i | i, j ∈
s ∈ S} and β(i) = { j | i ∈ s j ∈ S}. We will refer to {dk, j | sk ∈ S, j ∈ Z} by Dk . The preferences v are deﬁned as follows:
• vai (bi) = 0 for all i ∈ Z ;• vb1 (a1) = |Z | · |R| + 1;• vbi (ai) = |Z | · |R| for all i ∈ Z \ {1};• vb(c) = 1 for all b ∈ B and c ∈ C ;
• vb(b′) = |R| for all b,b′ ∈ B;
• vci (c j) = 1 if i, j ∈ s ∈ S and vci (c j) = 0 otherwise;
• vc (b) = |Z |3−|γ (k)| for all b ∈ B;k |Z |
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• vdi, j (di, j′ ) = 1 j 	= j′ and i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}; and
• vx(y) = −|Z |5 for all other x and y.
The value of −|Z |5 is a suﬃciently large negative value so that if vx(y) = −|Z |5, then x and y get negative utility
whenever they are together in the same coalition.
The partition π in question is deﬁned as π = {{a} | a ∈ A} ∪ {B ∪ C} ∪ {Dm |m ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}} so that
• uπ (a) = 0 for all a ∈ A;
• uπ (b) = |Z | · |R| for all b ∈ B;
• uπ (c) = |Z |3 for all c ∈ C ; and
• uπ (d) = |Z | − 1 for all d ∈ D .
We show that π is not popular if and only if (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C. If (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C, and
there exists an S ′ ⊆ S , a proper partitioning of N , then the following partition π ′ is more popular than and a Pareto
improvement over π :
π ′ = {{ai,bi}
∣∣ i ∈ Z}∪ {{Dm ∪ {ci | i ∈ sm}
} ∣∣ sm ∈ S ′
}∪ {{Dm}
∣∣ sm ∈ S \ S ′
}
.
In partition π ′ , the players get utility as follows:
• uπ ′(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A;
• uπ ′(b) = |Z | · |R| for all b ∈ B \ {b1};
• uπ ′(b1) = |Z | · |R| + 1;
• uπ ′(c) = |Z |3 for all c ∈ C ; and
• uπ ′(d) = |Z | − 1 for all d ∈ D .
We now show that if π is not popular, then (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C. If π is not popular, then there exists
another partition π ′′ 	= π ′ which is more popular than π . Then, it follows that there exists at least one coalition T ∈ π ′′
such that DT (π,π ′′) > 0. If {a1,b1} ∈ π ′′ , then a1 is indifferent between π and π ′′ but b1 strictly prefers π ′′ to π ′ . We
prove that {a1,b1} is the only possible coalition in which a majority of players prefers π ′′ to π . To prove the claim, we show
that for any coalition T ∈ π ′′ , if there is a player i ∈ T such that i prefers π ′′ to π , then DT (π,π ′′) < 0.
(a) Consider the case that a ∈ A strictly prefers π ′′ to π . This is not possible since no player in A can improve because
they do not like anyone.
(b) Let bi ∈ B \ {b1} be a player who prefers π ′′ to π . Then π ′′(bi) = {bi} ∪ X where X ⊆ B ∪ C ∪ {ai}. If there exists
an x ∈ N \ ((B \ {bi}) ∪ C ∪ {ai}), such that x ∈ π ′′(bi), then uπ ′′(bi) < 0. If X ⊂ B ∪ C , then bi does not prefer π ′′ to
π . Therefore X contains ai and at least one element from ((B \ {i}) ∪ C . But then, every player in π ′′(bi) \ {bi} gets
negative utility and prefers π to π ′′ .
(c) Let ci ∈ C be a player who is happier in π ′′ than in π . Then, π ′′(ci) \ {ci} ⊆ C ∪ B ∪ {dk, j | k ∈ β(i)}). If this were not
that case, then ci gets negative utility. Note that ci likes the following different types of sets of players: {c j | j ∈ γ (i)}
(there are between two to six players of this type), Dk where i ∈ sk ∈ S (there are between one to three sets of this
type), and B .
Player ci may prefer π ′′ to π if π ′′(ci) contains a suﬃcient number of players from the sets of players outlined
above. We will show that if ci prefers π ′′ to π , then Dπ ′′(ci)(π,π ′′) < 0.
We know that players from different sets Dk and Dk′ will get negative utility if they are in the same coalition.
Similarly, if players from B and Dk are together in π ′′(ci), they will all get negative utility.
Also, let us say that j /∈ sk but j ∈ γ (i). Then if c j is in π ′′(ci) along with players from Dk , then c j and all the
players in Dk get negative utility. Therefore, the best ci can do is to be with (i) B and {c j | j ∈ γ (i)} together or (ii)
one of the sets Dk along with those c js such that j ∈ sk ∈ S . In either case, ci is indifferent between π and π ′′ as
he gets utility |Z |3 in both partitions.
(d) No player in d ∈ D can prefer another partition π ′′ to π as d is already in a coalition with all the player he likes.
If π ′′ is more popular than π , we already know that {a1,b1} ∈ π ′′ . In order to ensure that π ′′ is more popular than
π , each player N \ {b1} should be indifferent between π and π ′′ . This is because we already know that no player
x ∈ N \ {b1} can be strictly happier in π ′′ without making the majority of the players in π ′′(x) strictly less happy.
We know that players in B are not together in the same coalition in π ′′ . Since players in B cannot be together it must
be that each bi is with its corresponding ai . Similarly, since players in C cannot be together with players in B anymore,
they must utilize their positive valuation for players in some set Dm . We already saw that each ci must be in a coalition
with players in Dm and two other players c j and ck where {i, j,k} = sm ∈ S . Therefore, we have shown that there exists
a subset D ′ ⊆ {D1, . . . , D |S|} such that each set Da in D ′ hosts three players {ci, c j, ck} from C such that {i, j,k} = sa ∈ S .
Therefore, there exists a partition S ′ ⊆ S of N and (R, S) is a ‘yes’ instance of E3C. This completes the proof. 
An interesting open problem is whether natural restricted classes of ASHGs always admit a popular partition.
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Complexity of ASHGs. We use the following abbreviations: symm (for symmetric preferences), strict (for strict preferences), grand (when the partition in
question consists of the grand coalition), IR (when the partition is also required to be individually rational), and trivial (when the problem is trivial because
existence is already guaranteed).
Concept Veriﬁcation Existence Computation
NS in P (Obs. 2)
trivial ([9], symm) PLS-complete ([9,21], symm)
NP-complete [37] NP-hard [37]
IS in P (Obs. 2)
trivial ([9], symm) PLS-complete ([22], symm)
NP-complete [37] NP-hard [37]
CIS in P (Obs. 2) trivial [4] in P (Th. 1)
C coNP-complete ([35], symm) NP-hard (Th. 2, symm) NP-hard (Th. 2, symm)
SC coNP-complete (Th. 3, symm) NP-hard (Th. 2, symm) NP-hard (Th. 2, symm)
PO
coNP-complete (Th. 10, strict & symm)
trivial
NP-hard (Cor. 1, IR)
coNP-complete (Th. 9, GC) in P (Th. 11, strict)
CSC coNP-complete (Th. 8, GC) trivial [36] NP-hard (Th. 12, IR)
Perfect in P (Th. 7) in P (Th. 7) in P (Th. 7)
MaxUtil coNP-complete (Th. 4) trivial (Obs. 1) NP-hard (Th. 4)
MaxEgal coNP-complete (Th. 6) trivial (Obs. 1) NP-hard (Th. 6)
MaxElite trivial (Th. 5) in P (Obs. 1) in P (Th. 5)
EF in P (Obs. 2) trivial (Obs. 3) in P (Obs. 3)
EF & NS in P (Obs. 2) NP-complete (Th. 13, symm) NP-hard (Th. 13, symm)
EF & PO coNP-complete (Th. 10) Σ p2 -complete (Th. 14) Σ
p
2 -hard (Th. 14)
Popular coNP-complete (Th. 15) NP-hard (Th. 15) NP-hard (Th. 15)
10. Conclusion and discussion
We presented a number of new computational results concerning stable, fair, optimal, and popular partitions of ASHGs.
Both new and existing results are summarized in Table 1. We saw that considering CSC deviations facilitates arguments
about more complex Pareto optimal improvements. As a result, we present similar computational results for CSC stability
and Pareto optimality. It was shown that under various restrictions of preferences, verifying, checking the existence, and
computing stable, fair, optimal and popular partitions is computationally intractable. On a more positive note, we proposed a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing a contractually individually stable (CIS) partition. It is also seen that the existence
of a perfect partition can be checked eﬃciently, and that for strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be computed
eﬃciently.
There are some interesting contrasts in the results. For example, whereas a Pareto optimal partition can be computed
in polynomial time when preferences are strict, checking whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete
even in the restricted setting of strict and symmetric preferences. Even though the existence of an envy-free partition and
the existence of a Nash stable partition are guaranteed under symmetric preferences, checking the existence of a partition
which satisﬁes both properties simultaneously is computationally hard. Finally, verifying popular outcomes is coNP-complete
whereas the same problem is computationally easy for house allocation and even the stable roommates setting.
A number of new questions arise as a result of our study. The complexity of computing a Pareto optimal partition for
ASHGs with unrestricted preferences is still open. We note that Algorithm 1 for computing a CIS partition may very well
return a partition that fails to satisfy individual rationality, i.e., players may get negative utility. It is an open question how
to eﬃciently compute a CIS partition that is guaranteed to satisfy individual rationality. Furthermore, the complexity of
computing a CSC stable partition which is not necessarily IR is still open.
We highlighted the logical relationships between different stability, fairness, optimality, and popularity concepts from
cooperative game theory, social choice and welfare theory. It will be interesting to examine these relationships in other
domains, in particular with respect to strategic issues. Other directions for future research include approximation algorithms
to compute maximum utilitarian or egalitarian social welfare for different representations of hedonic games. Finally, there
is scope for further work on the dynamics of deviations in various classes of hedonic games.
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